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The Ideal and the Actual in
Procedural Due Process
by NORMAN W. SPAULDING1
Abstract
The law proceduralists write about and teach is nothing like what most
ordinary Americans experience when they step into court. Indeed, the
evidence shows that most Americans who have legal problems do not ever
get to court, nor do they receive a meaningful alternative hearing. In this
way both judicial and academic discourse on procedure, even among those
who see glaring problems of access to justice, is idealized, abstract, and
ossified—unconnected to the actual. This Essay describes the ideal/actual
divide in procedure—the cognitive, doctrinal and ideological effects of
lingering on the ideal side of it, and the forms of subordination perpetuated
on the actual side. The Essay begins by turning away from the federal courts,
which decide less than two percent of all cases in the United States, in order
to examine a series of recent cases and reports on the actual administration
of justice in state courts, in state and federal administrative agencies, and in
private arbitration. These, after all, are the forums in which ordinary people
experience the administration of justice. The examples to which the Essay
points draw into relief the extent of the ideal/actual divide, the scope of
procedural failure in these settings, and the profound consequences for
vulnerable and marginal populations. The Essay closes by calling for a
reconceptualization of both pedagogy and procedural doctrine from the
perspective of the actual. First and foremost, the reality of how procedure
works for ordinary people, including how it fails them, must be studied more
closely, taught more frequently, and incorporated into debates about
procedural reform.

1. © 2020. Nelson Bowman Sweitzer and Marie B. Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford
Law School, B.A. Williams College, J.D. Stanford Law School. This essay is dedicated to my
former colleague, mentor, teacher, and coauthor Barbara Allen Babcock, 1938-2020, for whom the
legitimacy of the law always turned on the experiences of ordinary people in the legal process. I
am grateful to Ocean Lu, Ariella Park, and Hannah Schwarz for exceptional assistance with
research.
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Introduction
The field of procedure is in danger of slipping into a kind of formalist
slumber. Most scholars who teach and write in the field consider ourselves,
our classes, and our scholarship to be quintessentially realist—we seek to
reveal the role of procedure in shaping substantive outcomes and we insist
on attending to the subtleties of facts and design choices in dispute
resolution. And yet the procedural law we write about and teach is nothing
like what most ordinary Americans experience when they step into court.
Indeed, the evidence shows that most Americans who have legal problems
do not ever get to court, nor do they receive a meaningful alternative hearing.
In this way the discourse of procedure, even among those who see glaring
problems of access to justice, is idealized, abstract, and ossified—
unconnected to the actual. As the country has become increasingly diverse,
wealth disparities more acute, and a deep economic depression lies before us,
this inattention to the actual is dangerous—a threat to the legitimacy of the field.
Part of the problem is that analysis of what is actually happening outside
the federal courts in the forums where most ordinary Americans seek justice
tends to begin and end with study of a handful of canonical procedural due
process cases from the so-called “due process revolution” of the 1960s and
1970s.2 Judge Friendly’s landmark article in 1975 on procedural due process
and the administrative state crystalized the spirit of these cases, insisting that
adjudications in which most ordinary Americans participate do not have to
be, indeed, cannot be, designed like trials.3 The highly decentralized,
participatory, time-consuming, attorney-run traditions of adversary
adjudication have their place, he allowed, but not in run-of-the-mill cases in
which things such as entitlement to Social Security benefits are determined.
In a mass society there must be procedural tools for the mass processing of
claims leavened by minimum guarantees of procedural due process (all
bowdlerized, as it happens, from the gold standard of adversarial trial).4
These include, as every law student learns in first year procedure, and indeed
2. The early cases involved both administrative procedures deemed inadequately
participatory and ex parte pre-judgment remedies in debtor-creditor disputes. On the administrative
law side, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). With regard to ex parte pre-judgment
remedies, see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); see also Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969). Both lines of authority relied heavily on two earlier decisions from the 1950s.
See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
3. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975).
4. See Norman W. Spaulding, The Enclosure of Justice, Courthouse Architecture, Due
Process, and the Dead Metaphor of Trial, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311 (2012) [hereinafter
Enclosure]; Norman W. Spaulding, Due Process Without Judicial Process? Anti-Adversarialism
in American Legal Culture, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2249 (2017) [hereinafter Due Process].
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instinctively seems to know, an impartial decision maker, the right to notice,
and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before state action affects life,
liberty, or property.
Scholarly responses to this approach to due process analysis have been
sharply divided. On the left, the balancing test that accompanied the
endorsement of mass processing by the Burger Court has been viewed as
unduly obsessed with the accuracy and efficiency of government decisions
and inattentive to other key due process interests (particularly the
participation, equality, and dignity of individuals with claims against the
state).5 The balancing test has also been viewed as a failure to the extent that
it has resulted in denial of the right to counsel to those who cannot afford a
lawyer in civil cases. In such cases, the stakes appear to be at least as high,
if not higher, than in criminal cases where the Supreme Court has long held
that state subsidized counsel is constitutionally required.6 But the Court
adopted a strong presumption against the right to counsel in civil matters and
has recently reaffirmed it.7 On the right, the balancing test has been subject
to lacerating criticism for its malleability and subjectivity, even though an
increasingly conservative Supreme Court has relied heavily on the test to
favor the government’s interests over the liberty interests of individuals
caught up in the bureaucratic machinery of the state.8
Academic and classroom discussions thus tend to gravitate around two
issues: whether certain key features of adversarial justice (such as access to
a lawyer9) are constitutionally mandatory even though a full trial is not, and
what exceptional government interests can justify dispensing with either
notice or a hearing (or both).10 At the structural and normative level, this
framing invites comparison between administrative processes (where mass
5. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 674 (2d ed. 1988); Jerry L.
Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication: in Mathews
v. Eldridge Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976); Martin H.
Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due
Process, 95 YALE. L.J. 455 (1986).
6. Compare Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding no constitutional
right to counsel where termination of parental rights is at stake), with Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972) (holding constitutional right to counsel for defendant tried in a case where offense
was punishable by imprisonment up to six months and/or a $1,000 fine, and who was given a ninety
day jail sentence).
7. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) (upholding denial of counsel in civil contempt
proceeding resulting in confinement for failure to pay child support where other procedural
guarantees could ensure accuracy of contempt finding).
8. See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85; Richard
Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747 (1990).
9. See Turner, 564 U.S. at 431; Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305
(1985); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 18.
10. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Sniadach, 395
U.S. at 339 (citing cases in which exigent circumstances justify summary process).
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processing is the rule), and the judicial process (where it is supposed to be a
closely regulated exception). It also invites either lamentation on the
“vanishing trial”—the remarkable late twentieth century decline in the
number of cases disposed of by trial11—or insistence on the imperatives of
efficient administration of claims.12
But in most procedure casebooks, as in the literature more broadly,
analysis of what is actually happening outside the federal courts in the
forums where most Americans litigate is scant, and tends to conclude with
debate about the canonical procedural due process cases.13 The vanishing
trial theme continues through the study of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure because many modern doctrines empower a judge to take cases
away from juries and, increasingly, to dispose of cases before trial.14 Some
of the challenges associated with mass processing of claims then resurface
in the study of joinder and complex litigation. Remarkably, however, the
study of how due process works outside the federal courts in the spaces
where the vast majority of ordinary people encounter the administration of
justice generally does not resurface.15 This is remarkable given that federal
11. Mark Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 530 (2004) (“The portion of federal
civil cases resolved by trial fell from 11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002 . . . in every case category.”).
On the deeper historical forces accompanying the disappearance of trial, see Spaulding, Enclosure,
supra note 4.
12. Here the political alignment is not as clear as it sometimes seems, because the roots of the
theory of due process justifying administrative mass processing of claims lie in the progressive
New Deal project of displacing time-consuming, costly adjudication in conservative courts with
rational, technocratic, efficient agency adjudication. Proceduralists trained to read the New Deal
through the egalitarian aspirations of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
always take stock of this fact. See Spaulding, Due Process, supra note 4.
13. Personal jurisdiction is an exception, at least to the extent that attention is extended
beyond the formal Fourteenth Amendment analysis to the nature of the specific state court system,
any state law claims, and differences between state and federal courts. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach.,
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915
(2011); Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462 (1985); Worldwide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
14. Most prominently, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which in its modern
form gives a judge discretion to dismiss claims she finds implausible before discovery takes place,
see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and the motion for summary judgment, which in its
modern form does not require defendants to submit evidence establishing their innocence on issues
as to which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317 (1986). On the judge’s power to take cases away from juries during trial, see Galloway v.
United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (upholding constitutionality of the directed verdict).
15. One exception is Erie doctrine, but Erie is usually taught and written about as an object
lesson in judicial federalism, not an opportunity to closely examine state courts, and of course, what
Erie requires is deference to state substantive rules of decision, not state procedural rules of
decision. The edge cases dealing with the difference between the two offer a chance to consider
state procedural rules and their operation in practice, but the literature—vibrant and important as it
is—generally neglects this dimension. Removal offers another opportunity, but the reasons to

Winter 2021

IDEAL AND ACTUAL IN PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

265

cases comprise less than two percent of all civil cases in the United States.
For a few decades in the twentieth century there may have been parallels
between federal procedural law and the procedural law of the states, but there
are arguably more divergences than similarities now in some of the most
consequential areas of pretrial litigation.16 Scholarly and pedagogic attention
nevertheless remains fixed on federal litigation and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.17
This is most unfortunate. To begin with, it obscures the fact that even
modern litigation in federal court increasingly looks more like administrative
than adversarial adjudication. The fashionable term is “managerial
judging,”18 but in truth it is bureaucratic management through and through.
This turns the traditional understanding of the virtues and vices of courts as
compared to agencies on its head. The expansive assertion of judicial
authority to dispose of cases early and without trial also reflects the crushing
docket pressure judges face as state and federal legislatures have failed, for
decades, to fund courts and create new judgeships to match the number of
case filings.19
More importantly, inattention to adjudication outside the federal courts
obscures the magnitude of an alarmingly radical divide between ideal and
prefer federal or state court are often drawn from inference about strategic litigation preferences
rather than actual evidence about why a specific litigant prefers state or federal court. Cf. EDWARD
A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER,
AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (Yale University
Press 2000).
16. On the differences and similarities of federal and state procedure, see Stephen N. Subrin,
Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural
Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989); Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 703 (2016) (pointing out similarities between federal and state procedure in
practice); BABCOCK ET. AL, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 307–12 (6th ed. 2016).
17. There are some wonderful recent exceptions that are very much in harmony with the views
we express here, at least in the attention they draw to the differences between state and federal court
practices and the ways in which Supreme Court precedent has insulated procedural failure in state
courts from review. See Justin Weinstein-Tull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 VA. L. REV.
1031 (2020); Diego Zambrano, Federal Expansion and the Decay of State Courts, 86 U. CHI. L.
REV. 2101 (2019); Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2283
(2018). In the pages that follow, this Essay not only reports data on state court practices, but these
data are placed alongside evidence of procedural failure in administrative adjudication at both the
state and federal level, and alternative dispute resolution systems such as arbitration. The goal is
to develop a synthetic picture of adjudication.
18. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 375 (1982). See also Andrew D.
Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation,
105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (2017) (describing judge’s role in coordinating and reviewing settlements
in class actions and MDL).
19. See Michael J. Graetz, Trusting the Courts: Redressing the State Court Funding Crisis,
143 DAEDALUS 96, 97 (2014) (“many years of tight and frequently declining funding have exacted
a substantial toll on the capacity of our courts to function as they should”; gathering sources).
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ordinary procedural justice. The concepts of procedural justice and the
debates described above are in fact highly idealized. Isolated coverage of
procedural failure in individual cases tends merely to reinforce idealism by
promoting discussion about which elements of ideal procedure are most
worthy of fidelity, most central to any project of rectifying the specific
failing. Meanwhile, what most Americans experience is, in truth, nothing
like what the models of either administrative or judicial process describe,
and nothing like the design debates about procedure in the federal courts,
whatever its defects may be. Procedural failure, moreover, is far from
isolated. Indeed, in every area of adjudication outside the federal courts there
is alarming evidence of failure, and the more marginal the relevant
population of individual claimants, the more systemic the failure, the more
inhumane the treatment of litigants appears to be, and the more demoralizing
and compromising the position of judges and other decision makers.20
This Essay describes the ideal/actual divide, the cognitive, doctrinal and
ideological effects of lingering on the ideal side of it, and the forms of
subordination perpetuated on the actual side. Sections I and II rely on a
series of recent cases and reports on the actual administration of justice in
state courts, administrative agencies, and private arbitration—the forums
where ordinary people most commonly litigate.21 The examples are not
comprehensive, and they must be read with an eye to the risks of selection
bias and generalization. But they are sufficient to draw into relief the extent
of the ideal/actual divide and the need for greater attention to the actual. In
Section III, the Essay calls for a reconceptualization of both pedagogy and
procedural reform from the perspective of the actual. First and foremost, the
reality of how procedure works for ordinary people, including how it often
fails them, must be studied more closely and taught more frequently.
Second, the effects on marginalized and vulnerable populations in particular
must be identified and the voices of these people must be heard in
20. None of this is to deny the problems that exist in federal litigation. Among the most
disturbing, given the distinctive function of federal courts in the framework of judicial federalism,
is that bureaucratic case-management techniques are complemented, in some areas of high-volume
filings, by standards of review that sharply circumscribe the independent judgment a judge may
exercise to resolve allegations that a state actor has violated federal constitutional rights of a litigant.
These are particularly prevalent in litigation asserting that state actors have committed
constitutional error (e.g., habeas, prison conditions, and §1983 officer and municipal liability suits).
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: HOW YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS BECAME UNENFORCEABLE (2017).
21. The studies and reports include: The Department of Justice’s Report on the City of
Ferguson, litigation brought against municipal courts around the country following the Ferguson
Report, studies of state courts conducted by the National Center for State Courts, reports of the
Office of Inspector General for the Department of Veterans Affairs, evidence of the role of
immigration judges in removal and asylum proceedings, data on claims processing in the Social
Security Administration, and studies of the rise of private arbitration.

Winter 2021

IDEAL AND ACTUAL IN PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

267

conversations about procedural design. This is essential not only for
deliberation on effective reforms but for building an inclusive concept of
procedure equal to the needs of a diverse twenty-first century society and
profession. The essence of procedural due process is a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. That is as true for the democratic legitimacy of the
classrooms where procedure is taught as it is for the spaces where
adjudication occurs and the pages of law journals where procedure is debated.
I. What is Ideal Procedure?
Ideal procedure is an abstraction, divorced from the realities of
litigation in the spaces most Americans experience them. First and foremost,
it is Olympian.
Analysis generally begins with and concentrates
(obsessively) on decisions emanating from the United States Supreme Court
and amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by the
Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure—a committee staffed
through appointments made by the Chief Justice. Both the selection and
interpretation of lower federal court cases, administrative agency decisions,
and alternative dispute resolution cases are filtered through the lens of
Supreme Court precedent even though in every important respect the
Supreme Court is the most distant supervisor of the discretionary decision
making and fact finding of federal and state trial courts, administrative
agencies, arbitral fora, and mediations. The administration of justice in the
state courts, if it is studied at all, is usually read comparatively through the
lens of federal procedure, which serves as an ideal type defined by the
Advisory Committee and the federal courts, or theories of judicial federalism.
Second, although empirical work is burgeoning in the field of
procedure, it paradoxically amplifies this top-down interpretive approach by
concentrating almost exclusively on measuring the effects of Supreme Court
decisions and amendments to the federal rules. Outside the work of the
National Center for State Courts, research on state courts pales in comparison
to the outpouring of quantitative empirical work on federal topics such as
new standards for the disposition of cases by motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Twombly and Iqbal, the summary judgment trilogy, the
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1983 and 1993 changes to Rule 11, and changes to the regulation of
discovery under Rule 26.22 Deep qualitative research is relatively scarce.23
Third, the discourse of due process, and therefore of procedure in
general, is framed by the structure of adversary trial even though trials occur
in a vanishingly small number of cases— so few as to have rendered the state
and federal constitutional right to a jury trial dead letter for most litigants.24
Notwithstanding the centrality of the ideal of trial in the conceptualization of
due process,25 many judges have come to view their role as promoting, if not
demanding, disposition before trial. As one federal judge famously observed
“a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial.”26 Notice the
contradiction—jury trial remains the gold standard of procedural due
process, but it almost never happens, and judges believe they have succeeded
in their role when trial is avoided. The important public purposes of trial are,
as a practical matter, subordinated to the assumed benefits of private
settlement and the efficiencies of pretrial disposition.27 In this way jury trial
is relegated to the purely ideal.
This is the height of procedural abstraction—a right central to the
legitimacy of the administration of justice that almost no one ever gets to
exercise. One might say, with one of the earliest critics of rights-talk, that
our relationship to trial and other adversary procedures now reflects our
status as “imaginary member[s] of an illusory sovereignty,” a relation that is
“just as spiritual as the relations of heaven to earth.”28 We are all potential
jurors, but only in trials we know will never happen.
There are, of course, strong historical and practical reasons for this
Olympian orientation. Most obviously, the bar exam tests federal procedure,
22. David Freeman Engstrom, for example, catalogues the outpouring of empirical work on
plausibility pleading and its methodological limitations, in The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study
of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013). There are notable exceptions. See Andrew
Hammond, Poverty Lawyering in the States, in HOLES IN THE SAFETY NET: FEDERALISM AND
POVERTY 215 (Ezra Rosser ed., 2019); see also Maureen Carroll, Civil Procedure and Economic
Inequality, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. 269 (forthcoming Winter 2020); Maureen Carroll, Access to
Counsel in Civil Rights Class Actions, in CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF CLASS
ACTIONS (Brian Fitzpatrick & Randall Thomas eds., forthcoming 2020).
23. There are some excellent exceptions here too. See, e.g., DEBORAH HENSLER, ET AL.,
CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT: HOW CULTURE, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS SHAPE COLLECTIVE
LITIGATION (2016); Hammond, supra note 22.
24. On jury trial in state and federal courts, see supra, note 10. On the right to jury trial in
administrative proceedings, see Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989) (dissolving
Seventh Amendment inquiry into Article III analysis).
25. See Spaulding, Enclosure, supra note 4.
26. Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4 (1992) (quoting In re Warner Commc’ns Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740
(S.D.N.Y. 1985)) (emphasis added).
27. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
28. KARL MARX, On the Jewish Question, MARX AND ENGELS: 1843-1844 154 (1975).
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so law students and law professors must attend to it at some level of
specificity. Supreme Court decisions are controlling in federal courts under
Article III and in state courts under the Supremacy Clause where federal law
binds the states—so too, federal legislation sets the boundaries of subject
matter jurisdiction in federal courts.29 With respect to the FRCP, as with all
twentieth-century codification movements (the Restatements, the Uniform
Commercial Code, the Model Penal Code, the ABA’s Model Rules for
professional responsibility and judicial ethics, the Federal Rules of
Evidence) the Advisory Committee for Civil Rules aspired from the very
beginning to generate federal rules that would serve as standards for adoption
in the states. The goal of all codification movements is to distill the “best”
rules and universalize them in the name of uniformity, interpretive clarity,
and predictability.30 But if there are egalitarian roots to this enterprise in the
field of procedure (and there certainly are) there is also no mistaking the
elements of centralized, elite, expert control—and these elements have
permitted the egalitarianism of the rules to be undercut over time,31
subordinating the virtues of access, localism, decentralization, particularity,
discretion, and even decision on the merits, to the demands of efficiency,
predictability, and rational bureaucratic administration.
For empiricists, federal data are quite simply easier to come by and
analyze systematically through PACER. As the National Center for State
Courts describes, most state
case management systems were initially developed to schedule and
record case filings and events (e.g., hearings and trials) and report
the progress of the case through the system in general terms.
Although some of these systems capture detailed case-level
information, very few are programmed to extract and report that
information in a format conducive to broader management-oriented
and case propulsion perspective. A related issue is the lack of
uniformity in the use of case definitions and counting rules. . . .
Perhaps the largest hurdle . . . [is that] court organizational structures
29. On the adjudication of federal rights in state courts, see Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2006).
30. On the history of the codification movement, see Norman W. Spaulding, The Luxury of
the Law: The Codification Movement and the Right to Counsel, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 983 (2004);
see also Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an
Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 311 (1988). On the increasing disuniformity between
procedure in federal and state courts, see Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the
States, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 411 (2018).
31. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987); Brooke D. Coleman, One
Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005 (2016).
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are the culmination of each state’s unique legal history and efforts
to improve the administration of justice.32
Meaningful empirical studies of state courts can be conducted, but this work
is far more time and resource intensive than studying federal court litigation.
Generalizations across states also are harder to make. The epistemological
consequences of this imbalance of attention are quite profound: because
federal courts are easier to study, proceduralists appear to know more about
federal litigation, and therefore have more to say about it, more to debate.
Federal litigation feels more familiar, more “real,” and hence more
important, even though it represents a tiny fraction of the actual
administration of justice.
This epistemological distortion is parlous, as the next section suggests,
because evidence of procedural failure in state courts, administrative
agencies, and alternative decision-making forums such as arbitration
indicates that idealized conceptions and debates about litigation in federal
court are, in fact, a world apart from the actual administration of justice.
Even if there is and always will be a need to attend to federal procedural law,
the case for the nearly exclusive attention it receives is weak. The next
Section begins with evidence from the operation of state courts. The
evidence from other forums, to which this Section turns thereafter, is equally
important to a synthetic understanding of the problem of procedural failure.
II. Procedural Failure in the Actual Administration of Justice
The actual administration of justice plays out for the most part beyond
the federal courts. In 2013, there were more than 16 million cases filed in
state courts as compared to just 259,489 filed in United States District
Courts.33 That means federal cases comprised less than two percent of all
civil cases in the United States. As Justin Weinstein-Tull trenchantly
observes in a recent study, “Local courts are . . . overwhelmingly the point
of contact between humans and our justice system.”34 There are also more
than twice as many federal administrative law judges who perform
“exclusively adjudicative functions” (1,584) as there are federal district court
judges, and more than four times as many federal administrative judges
32. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN
STATE COURTS 7–10 (2015) [hereinafter LANDSCAPE].
33. LANDSCAPE, supra note 32, at 6 n.36. For a more recent overview of state courts’
caseload, see COURT STATS. PROJECT NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK
OF STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2015 STATE COURT CASELOADS (2016), http://www.court
statistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/23818/ewsc-2015.pdf.
34. Weinstein-Tull, supra note 17.
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(3,370)—administrative staff whose functions include both adjudication and
other work.35 Administrative agency judges (both ALJs and AJs) work in
agencies across the federal bureaucracy.36 The ALJs who work for the Social
Security Administration alone handle more than twice as many hearings and
appeal dispositions (more than half a million) as the entire number of filings
in federal district courts each year.37 The EEOC handles an average of
96,000 discrimination claims each year, and parallel state employment
agencies handle a massive number of filings as well.38 Only about two
hundred filings with the EEOC result in federal litigation initiated by the
agency each year (0.2% of all the claims filed), and few employees who
receive a right to sue letter from the agency go on to sue on their own.39 The
agency’s action is therefore functionally dispositive in the vast majority of
cases. In arbitration, the story is not greater filings than in federal court, but
rather claim suppression—the astonishingly low number of filings in
consumer protection and employment law relative to the massive expansion
of arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts over the last
few decades.40

35. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL.,
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 351 (7th ed. 2015).

HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND

36. Kent H. Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1645
(2016) (referring to ALJs and AJs as “the hidden judiciary,” judges who “mostly go about
unnoticed” even though their numbers and caseloads are “substantially larger than Article III
courts’”) (internal citation omitted).
37. Information about Social Security’s Hearings and Appeals Process, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/appeals (last visited June 27, 2020).
38. Samuel Estreicher, et al., Evaluating Employment Arbitration: A Call for Better Empirical
Research, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 375, 390 (2018).
39. Id. at 393 (noting that 84.1% of employees who filed with the EEOC “received right-tosue letters with no benefits” and that just 18.7% of those employees go on to bring suit in federal
court, making the agency’s decision not to become involved dispositive in the vast majority of
cases).
40. See David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239
(2012). The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau found that from 2010–2012 the average
number of individual arbitration claims filed before the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
regarding credit cards, prepaid cards, checking accounts, and payday loans, was just 415. Whereas
most credit cards, forty-four percent of insured deposits in checking accounts, and eighty-one
percent of prepaid cards include arbitration clauses in their contracts. CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a) 12–13 (2015), Arbitration Study Preliminary Results:
Section 1028(a) Study Results to Date 12–13 (2013), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_
cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf. See also Ronald L. Seeber & David B.
Lipsky, The Ascendancy of Employment Arbitrators in U.S. Employment Relations: A New Actor
in the American System?, 44 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 719 (2016); Alexander Colvin, An Empirical
Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1
(2011); Estreicher, supra note 38, at 383 (finding a total of less than 8,000 employment arbitration
cases in the AAA database between 2012-2017).
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This Section considers each forum for adjudication—state, agency, and
arbitral—in turn.
A. State Courts
The first thing to appreciate about litigation in state court beyond the
vast number of case filings relative to federal court, is that the subject matter
and stakes of state and federal court cases are quite different, making the
study of federal litigation a decidedly infelicitous proxy for American
litigation writ large. Federal civil litigation is, for instance, heavily centered
on torts and public law cases. In 2013, for instance, torts cases comprised
twenty-five percent of federal filings (increasingly aggregated under multidistrict litigation statute41), while public law cases (including civil rights
(12%)), habeas (20%), social security appeals (7%), and antitrust (1%)
comprised forty percent of the federal district courts’ docket.42 Together
these categories, along with labor and intellectual property cases, dominate
the federal docket. The amount in controversy requirement for diversity
jurisdiction ensures that the tort cases are relatively high value, and it is
unusual, outside areas such as habeas petitions, prisoner civil rights, and
social security appeals, for federal litigants to be unrepresented by counsel.43
Along every material dimension—subject matter, amount in
controversy, access to counsel, method of disposition, etc.—a radically
different picture emerges from the 2015 Landscape study of state courts
conducted by the National Center for State Courts.
[N]early two thirds (64%) were contract cases, and more than half
of those were debt collection (37%) and landlord/tenant cases
(29%). An additional sixteen percent (16%) were small claims cases
involving disputes valued at $12,000 or less ….

41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407; Andrew D. Bradt and Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendant’s
Terms: Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 1251,
1257 (2018) (noting that MDL “very often . . . functions as a tight knit aggregation from which a
global resolution emerges, whether by settlement or dispositive motion” and that “despite MDL’s
surface level modesty, fewer than three percent of cases are ever remanded back to the courts where
they were originally filed”).
42. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 2013, UNITED STATES COURTS, https://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2013 (last visited June 30,
2020).
43. See Mitchell Levy, Comment, Empirical Patterns of Pro Se Litigation in Federal District
Courts, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819, 1836 (2018) (finding that roughly nine percent to ten percent of
nonprisoner cases, as averaged over several four-year time periods, were filed by pro se plaintiffs
and even fewer involved pro se defendants).
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Despite widespread perceptions that civil litigation involves
high-value commercial and tort cases, only 357 cases (0.2%) had
judgments that exceeded $500,000 and . . . three-quarters (75%) of
all judgments were less than $5,200. . . . Only four percent (4%) of
cases were disposed of by bench or jury trial, summary judgment,
or binding arbitration. The overwhelming majority (97%) of these
were bench trials, almost half of which (46%) took place in small
claims or other civil cases . . . . A judgment was entered in nearly
half (46%) of the cases, most of which were likely default
judgments. . . . One of the most striking findings in the dataset was
the relatively large proportion of cases (76%) in which at least one
party was self-represented, usually the defendant. Tort cases were
the only ones in which a majority (64%) of cases had both parties
represented by attorneys.44
As these data indicate, a typical state court case is a fairly low monetary
value dispute in which the defendant is unrepresented, and the plaintiff
secures a default judgment. Indeed, the “vast majority” are “debt collection,
landlord/tenant, foreclosure, and small claims cases.”45 Creditors, landlords,
employers, and other people in positions of power are generally plaintiffs
and prefer state courts “for the simple reason that in most jurisdictions state
courts hold a monopoly on procedures to enforce judgments.”46 Moreover,
securing judgments is a “mandatory first step to being able to initiate
garnishment or asset seizure proceedings.”47 In a word, the state courts are
operating primarily as accelerated debt collection courts.
The conjunction of default judgments and individual defendants’ lack
of counsel is particularly troubling from a due process perspective. It means
that there is generally no merits review or adjudication to speak of—not only
44. LANDSCAPE, supra note 32, at iii–iv (emphasis added). For empirical analysis of state
court caseloads in 2010, see NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT (2012),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0021/29811/2010-EWSC.pdf. See also id. at
3 (finding two-thirds of state cases were processed in limited-jurisdiction courts); Weinstein-Tull,
supra note 17, at 1042 (noting that more than half of local court cases filed in 2015 were traffic
cases). Federal and state courts also diverge in the qualifications of judges. See id. at 1053
(“[T]wenty-six states allow non-lawyers to preside over limited-jurisdiction courts.”) (citing
William Glaberson, In Tiny Courts of N.Y., Abuses of Law and Power, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/nyregion/ 25courts.html).
45. LANDSCAPE, supra note 32, at v. Appeals are also exceedingly rare. See Theodore
Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts Redux? An Empirical Study of State
Court Trials on Appeal, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 100 (2015); Weinstein-Tull, supra note 17,
at 1039–1040.
46. LANDSCAPE, supra note 32, at v.
47. Id.
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no trial, but no merits determination whatsoever. And there are strong
incentives for plaintiff creditors, employers, and landlords to cut corners in
giving notice because, in the absence of defense counsel, the likelihood that
“gutter service” will be challenged is low. As the Landscape study
summarized: “Even if defendants might have the financial resources to hire
a lawyer to defend them in court, most would not because the cost of the
lawyer exceeds the potential judgment.”48 For all of these reasons, the
“idealized picture of an adversarial system in which both parties … can assert
all legitimate claims is an illusion. The costs and delays of civil litigation
greatly outpace the monetary value of most cases filed in state courts,
effectively denying access to justice for most litigants and undermining the
legitimacy of the courts as a fair and effective forum to resolve disputes.”49
The Landscape study laid particular emphasis on the stark difference
between what the data showed and the standard media-hyped conception of
Americans as overly litigious, especially in the area of personal injury and
product liability. But the real story, from the perspective of the actual, is the
disturbing overlap between the data from the Landscape study and other
evidence of procedural abuse in debt collection practices. A 2018 study
estimates that “77 million Americans—one in three adults—have a debt that
has been turned over to a private collection agency” and “in many state
courts, debt purchasers file more suits than any other type of plaintiff.”50
Creditors who secure a judgment can initiate court supervised “judgment
debtor examinations” during which defendants are required to disclose
information about their income and assets to satisfy the judgment. Failure
to appear can have devastating consequences. In 44 states, judges—
“including district court civil judges, small-claims court judges, clerkmagistrates, and justices of the peace—are allowed to issue arrest warrants
for failure to appear at post-judgment proceedings or for failure to provide
information about finances.
These warrants, usually called ‘body
48. Id. at iv–v. For an example of the barriers that unrepresented tenants face in summary
process eviction proceedings, see Esme Caramello, et al., Where A Lawyer Makes All the
Difference—and Only One Side Has One, 63 BOSTON BAR J. 1 (2019) (discussing procedural flaws
in summary process evictions identified by Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Adjartey
v. Central Division of the Housing Court Deptartment, 120 N.E. 3d 297 (Mass. 2019)).
49. LANDSCAPE, supra note 32, at v.
50. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A POUND OF FLESH: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
PRIVATE DEBT 4–5 (2018). The Covid-19 pandemic has only amplified the economic vulnerability
of debtors. Mary Williams Walsh, Federal Aid Has So Far Averted Personal Bankruptcies, but
Trouble Looms, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/17/business/pers
onal-bankruptcies-coronavirus.html (“[E]ven if Congress extends the relief measures, they are a
temporary salve that will do little to change the long-term patterns of income stagnation and
indebtedness that have left American households so vulnerable to financial shock. Total household
debt reached $14.3 trillion in the first quarter of this year, according to the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York—a record.”).
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attachments’ or ‘capias warrants’ are issued on the charge of contempt of
court.”51 In this way, the body of the debtor, the debtor’s physical liberty, is
converted into a surety on the debt by the law of procedure.52
Courts may then use bail as leverage to force the debtor to pay the value
of the civil judgment: “Once arrested, debtors may languish in jail for days
until they can arrange to pay the bail. In some cases, people were jailed for
as long as two weeks. Judges sometimes set bail at the exact amount of the
judgment. And the bail money is often turned over to the debt collector or
creditor as payment against the judgment.”53 As a lawyer engaged in debt
collection against student loan debtors in Texas nonchalantly observed, “‘It’s
easier to settle when the debtor is under arrest.’”54
This is rough justice by any measure. Indeed, the report found that
many of the people arrested for failure to appear at judgment debtor
examinations “had no idea a warrant had been issued for their arrest.”55 They
learned of the warrant and missed hearing at the time of arrest rather than
through statutorily prescribed methods of notice for the hearing. When the
underlying judgment is a default judgment, which the Landscape study
suggested is common, collections are taking place using the court’s
compulsory power with no merits inquiry into the underlying debt, often
against a pro se defendant. The post-judgment arrest for failure to appear at
a judgment debtor examination may be the first appearance of the defendant
in the entire proceeding. And all too frequently the “people who are jailed
or threatened with jail . . . are the most vulnerable Americans, living
paycheck to paycheck, one emergency away from financial catastrophe.”56
Many already rely on some form of public assistance such as “Social Security,
unemployment insurance, disability benefits, or veterans’ benefits . . . .”57
In addition to these questionable collection practices for private debts,
some state courts have become quite aggressive about enforcing courtimposed fines and fees. A 2009 Handbook published by the National Center
for State Courts describes proactive enforcement of unpaid court fines and
fees as “a means of ensuring compliance with court judgments, thereby
increasing public trust and confidence in the judicial system . . . [and]
51. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 50, at 6.
52. The roots of this debt collection procedure in western countries run at least as far back as
Roman law. See JOE DEVILLE, LIVED ECONOMIES OF DEFAULT: CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT
COLLECTION, AND THE CAPTURE OF AFFECT (Routledge 2015) (describing Roman debt collection
legislation providing that, after repayment periods failed, “the debtor’s body could be held as forfeit
for an outstanding debt”).
53. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 50, at 6.
54. Id. at 7.
55. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 50, at 6.
56. Id. at 7.
57. Id.
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increasing revenue.”58 The Handbook acknowledged that sweeping cuts in
court funding from state general revenue funds had amplified pressure on
courts to expand and collect fines and fees. But the effect of more aggressive
collection practices has been to compromise two traditional principles for the
administration of justice: first, that courts preserve their independence,
impartiality, and integrity in the eyes of the public by taking a relatively
passive stance on enforcement of debts owed to the court, and second that
equality and due process demand sensitivity to litigants’ actual ability to pay.
Indeed, the Handbook explicitly warned that jailing people for failing to pay
debts may not be cost effective (because the costs of incarceration can easily
exceed the debts one hopes to collect) but it failed to reference the due
process requirement of inquiry into a litigant’s ability to pay,59 and it
encouraged experimentation with “coercive measures”:
The perception among judges and court managers in many
jurisdictions is that if their own locality is economically depressed,
then many traffic and criminal defendants are unable to pay fines
and fees, particularly in cases involving a mandatory fine or jail
sentence. However, experienced collectors consistently assert that
all but a very few defendants have greater resources for meeting
their obligations than may be immediately apparent. Some “hardcore” defendants . . . will not pay their obligations . . . or will
eventually be impossible to locate. However, a much larger
percentage of defendants will pay all or part of the amount owed if
1) payment can be made without too much inconvenience, and 2)
increasingly coercive measures are applied by the collector.60
As we know from the Department of Justice’s Report on the Ferguson
Police Department, in at least some jurisdictions overly “coercive measures”
were vigorously pursued on terms that were also racially biased. The
Ferguson Report’s findings on racially discriminatory policing have received
widespread coverage. Less commonly noted are the Report’s findings on
due process failures in the municipal court, particularly the ways criminal
58. JOHN MATTHIAS & LAURA KLAVERSMA, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., CURRENT
PRACTICES IN COLLECTING FINES AND FEES IN STATE COURTS: A HANDBOOK OF COLLECTION
ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS 1 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter CURRENT PRACTICES]; see also id. at 5 (“Poor
or haphazard enforcement reflects negatively on the courts and justice in general.”). The report
goes on to stress the importance of procedural fairness and mentions payment plans and alternatives
such as community service to payment of court fines and fees. See id. at 35, 42. But it also
highlights Texas’ warrant system as “an extremely effective tool in encouraging compliance.” Id.
at 57.
59. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
60. CURRENT PRACTICES, supra note 58, at 12–13, 20 (emphasis added).

Winter 2021

IDEAL AND ACTUAL IN PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

277

and civil procedure were intertwined in its debt collection practices. The
municipal court not only failed to address stark racial disparities in
policing,61 it imposed significant fees and other costs, and it regularly jailed
city residents for failure to make payments when they did not have the means
to pay, creating a vicious, racialized cycle of imprisonment for these debts.62
The Department of Justice found other disturbing procedural
irregularities in the courts. Notice of violations of the municipal code made
it “difficult . . . to know how much is owed, where and how to pay the ticket,
what the options for payment are, what rights the individual has, and what
the consequences are for various actions or oversights.”63 And because
judges issue “rules of practice and procedure verbally and on an ad hoc
basis,” litigants have no way of knowing what will happen when they do
appear or how to assert their rights.64 These are basic defects in providing
constitutionally required notice.65 The city also amplified the fees and
charges associated with missed appearances by requiring “far more
defendants to appear in court than is required under state law.”66 Demanding
that an individual “appear at a specific place and time to pay a citation makes
it far more likely that the individual will fail to appear or pay the citation on
time, quickly resulting . . . in an arrest warrant and a suspended license.”67
The court also “impose[d] . . . fines without providing any process by which
a person can seek a fine reduction on account of financial incapacity.”68
These are straightforward abuses of the right to be heard.
Further, the court “treat[ed] a single missed, partial, or untimely
payment as a missed appearance. In such a case, the court immediately
issue[d] an arrest warrant without any notice or opportunity to explain why
61. CIV. RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 43 (2015) [hereinafter FERGUSON REPORT] (noting that “[a]ttempts to raise legal
claims are met with retaliatory conduct” by municipal judges).
62. For example, ninety-three percent of people held in Ferguson at least two days, and in
some cases more than seventy-two hours, before release were black. FERGUSON REPORT, supra
note 61, at 60. See also id. at 43 (“[T]he municipal court does not generally deem the code
violations that come before it as jail-worthy, [but] it routinely views the failure to appear in court
to remit payment to the City as jail-worthy, and commonly issues warrants to arrest individuals
who have failed to make timely payment. Similarly, while the municipal court does not have any
authority to impose a fine of over $1,000 for any offense, it is not uncommon for individuals to pay
more than this amount to the City of Ferguson—in forfeited bond payments, additional Failure to
Appear charges, and added court fees—for what may have begun as a simple code violation. In
this way, the penalties that the court imposes are driven not by public safety needs, but by financial
interests.”).
63. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 61, at 44.
64. Id. at 45.
65. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
66. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 61, at 48.
67. Id. at 48–49.
68. Id. at 53.
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a payment was missed—for example, because the person was sick, or the
court closed its doors early that day.”69 And the city’s police department was
used “in large part as a collection agency for its municipal court . . . . While
issuing municipal warrants against people who have not appeared or paid
their municipal code violation fines is sometimes framed as addressing the
failure to abide by court rules, in practice, it is clear that warrants are
primarily issued to coerce payment.”70 After arrest, the court failed to credit
or record a person’s time served, and it set bonds that often exceeded the
amount owed to the court.71
If these failures of due process and equal protection seem more closely
associated with criminal law than civil procedure, they should not.72 First,
as the Department of Justice Report emphasized, many of the underlying
citations that initiated the cycle of fines, fees, warrants, and arrest were for
non-criminal municipal code violations.73 Thus, criminal charges and
confinement were used for civil matters unconnected to threats to public
safety. Second, there is evidence that judges on the municipal court treated
debtors as a valuable revenue source. As the Report summarized: “The
municipal court does not act as a neutral arbiter of the law or a check on
unlawful police conduct. Instead, the court primarily uses its judicial
authority as the means to compel the payment of fines and fees that advance
the City’s financial interests.”74 In this respect, Ferguson represents a
particularly tragic example of municipal and judicial parasitism upon the
very communities these institutions are supposed to serve—a perverse
outcome of forcing state courts to operate on shoestring budgets that directly
undermines public faith in the administration of justice.
Third, as with the collection of private debts discussed in the Landscape
study above, a key procedural tool resulting in incarceration for failure to
pay criminal or civil assessments in Ferguson was the use of civil contempt
as the basis for issuing a warrant upon a resident’s failure to appear. Followon litigation in other jurisdictions reveals that municipal courts facing severe
budget shortfalls have converted fines and fees into civil judgments in aid of
their collection efforts, and some courts regularly fail to make the

69. Id.
70. Id. at 55–56. Imprisoning people for non-payment who do not have the means to pay is a
clear violation of due process under Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). Id. at 57.
71. Id. at 60 (“Court records do not even track the total amount of time a person has spent in
jail as part of a case. When asked why this is not tracked, a member of court staff told us: ‘It’s only
three days anyway.’”).
72. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 61, at 60.
73. Id. at 56 (“[T]he warrants issued by the court are overwhelmingly issued in non-criminal
traffic cases that would not themselves result in a penalty of imprisonment.”).
74. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 61, at 3.
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constitutionally required inquiry into a person’s ability to pay before
punishing failure to appear with arrest and jail time.75
This specific due process violation became especially draconian in
Jennings, Missouri. The Jennings court conducted closed door, off record,
mass hearings for primarily African American debtors who were held in jail
in unconscionably filthy and degrading prison conditions for failure to pay
court-imposed fines and fees. Court hearings for imprisoned debtors took
place only once a week, forcing anyone who could not make payments to
remain in custody, and at the hearings there was no constitutionally required
inquiry into litigants’ ability to pay. Debtors were verbally abused by their
jailors and forced to bid their way out of unconscionable conditions of
confinement even as new fines and fees mounted. The complaint described
“overcrowded cells” in which:
impoverished people owing debts to the City . . . are denied
toothbrushes, toothpaste, and soap; they are subjected to the stench
of excrement and refuse in their congested cells; they are surrounded
by walls smeared with mucus, blood, and feces; they are kept in the
same clothes for weeks and without access to laundry . . . they step
on top of other inmates whose bodies cover nearly the entire
uncleaned cell floor, in order to access a single shared toilet that the
City does not clean . . . they develop illnesses and infections in open
wounds that spread to other inmates . . . they endure days and weeks
without being allowed to use the shower; women are not given
adequate hygiene products for menstruation . . . they are routinely
denied vital medical care and prescription medication . . . they are
75. Ferguson and Jennings are egregious examples, but they are not wholly unique. One study
found that although Ferguson stood out in the extent to which the city relied on fines and fees for
the city budget, “there are other Missouri municipalities and other United States cities that rely
more heavily on fines and fees as a percentage of their court budgets.” U.S. COMM’N ON CIV.
RIGHTS, TARGETED FINES AND FEES AGAINST COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 20 (2017). Moreover, as
in Ferguson, race appears to be correlated with the imposition of high fines. “Among the fifty cities
with the highest proportion of revenues from fines, the median size of African American
population—on a percentage basis—is more than five times greater than the national median.’” Id.
at 23 (quoting Dan Kopf, The Fining of Black America, PRICEONOMICS (June 24, 2016),
https://priceonomics.com/the-fining-of-black-america/). See Kopf, supra (“When we began this
analysis, we expected that fines would be correlated with income levels . . . . [T]hat’s not what we
found . . . . The best indicator that a government will levy an excessive amount of fines is if its
citizens are Black.”). For examples of litigation challenging the procedural fairness of the
enforcement of legal financial obligations in other jurisdictions, see Cain v. City of New Orleans,
327 F.R.D. 111 (E.D. La. 2018) (holding that New Orleans’ court funding system, in which the
judges who imposed fines and fees depended on that money for their own budgets, violated due
process); Complaint, Graff v. Aberdeen Enterprizes II, Inc., Case No. 4:17-CV-606-CVE-JFJ, 2018
WL 4517468 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 20, 2018) (alleging unconstitutional reliance by the Oklahoma
Sheriffs’ Association and Oklahoma judges on fines and fees imposed on poor defendants).
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provided food so insufficient and lacking in nutrition that inmates
are forced to compete to perform demeaning janitorial labor for
extra food rations and exercise; and they must listen to the screams
of other inmates being beaten or tased or in shrieking pain from
unattended medical issues . . . [;] jail guards routinely taunt
impoverished people when they are unable to pay for their release
. . . guards routinely laugh at the inmates and humiliate them with
discriminatory and degrading epithets about their poverty and their
physical appearance.76
This is the actual, a world apart from our understandings about due
process and human decency. Remarkably, the ideal existed right alongside
this debased procedural system. If the debtor had the means to retain
counsel, the same court promptly vacated any arrest warrants and conducted
its process like the casebooks teach due process should work. Legitimate
and dehumanizing procedures were thus dispensed by the same court for the
same kinds of debts. Access to counsel, which turned heavily on class and
race, determined which process a debtor received.77
In jurisdictions where either private civil debts or legal financial
obligations, or both, are collected using these techniques, and in those
documented in the Landscape study showing how commonly local courts
function as debt collection forums via default judgment against pro se
litigants, ordinary Americans experience the administration of justice on
terms that are utterly foreign to the standard pedagogy of legal education and
the orientation of legal scholarship in the field of procedure.78 Indeed, the
lesson of the actual in Jenkins and other litigation following the revelations
in Ferguson is that civil procedure and criminal punishment have become
enmeshed in some jurisdictions in ways that not only trap low income people
and people of color in a cycle of mounting debt, but also result in debtors’
prison for both civil and criminal debts and disabling collateral
76. Complaint, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, Case No. 4:15-cv-252-CEJ (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8,
2015) ¶¶ 2, 4.
77. Id.; Campbell Robertson, Missouri City to Pay $4.7 Million to Settle Suit Over Jailing
Practices, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/us/missouri-city-topay-4-7-million-to-settle-suit-over-jailing-practices.html.
78. There are, of course, extraordinarily talented, dedicated judges all around the country
working in the state courts. They too have been placed in impossible situations—having to balance
their deep commitment to due process against staggering caseloads and shrinking budgets. My
purpose here is not to criticize the judiciary or to overgeneralize from some of the most disturbing
examples of procedural failure where individual courts or judges have gone astray. It is to state in
a clear-eyed way the consequences of systematic defunding of the courts and policies that are
dehumanizing for both litigants and judges. Ferguson, Jenkins, and other similar cases are wake
up calls, and not just for experts in criminal law and procedure.
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consequences. This not only perpetuates racial subordination and drives
people into poverty, it can cause “profound estrangement” in its victims,
undermining the legitimacy of courts in their eyes, and ultimately their faith
in the rule of law.79
B. Arbitration
One of the central findings of the Landscape study is that most cases
are resolved before trial because the costs of litigation in state court exceed
the value of the cases. The study notes that “[i]n some instances, the costs
of even initiating the lawsuit or making an appearance as a defendant would
exceed the value of the case.”80 That is because “three quarters (75%) of all
judgments were less than $5,200.”81 In this way, ordinary people are simply
priced out of litigation by the cost of filing fees, other litigation costs, and
attorneys’ fees.
Although arbitration has long been promoted as a more cost-effective
procedure, a similar problem surfaces there—boxing ordinary people out of
both court and ADR. A New York Times investigation recently concluded
that by including contract clauses that ban class actions and mandate
arbitration, “companies have essentially disabled consumer challenges to
practices like predatory lending, wage theft and discrimination.”82 A federal
judge interviewed for the study commented that “‘[o]minously, business has
a good chance of opting out of the legal system altogether and misbehaving
without reproach.’”83 Just as in the state courts, plaintiffs frequently cannot
79. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE
L.J. 2054, 2057 (2017) (summarizing social science research showing that people of color are
“subject only to the brute force of the state while excluded from its protection” and criticizing the
narrow focus on the “legitimacy deficit” in legal scholarship on local law enforcement).
80. LANDSCAPE, supra note 32, at iv.
81. Id.
82. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck
of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/deal
book/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html; see also David Horton, Infinite
Arbitration Clauses, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2020) (describing the use of infinite arbitration
clauses, which contain broad language to mandate arbitration for any potential dispute that could
arise between the parties and any related party in perpetuity). But see Andrea Cann Chandrasekher
& David Horton, Arbitration Nation: Data from Four Providers, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9 (2019)
(noting that some enterprising plaintiffs’ lawyers have filed class action-style cases, bringing
dozens or even hundreds of related arbitrations against the same company). However, arbitration
“is not currently picking up the slack left by the decline of the class action . . . . it is [] a pale
substitute for the class action.” Id. at 51.
83. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 82; see also Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole
of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679, 696–97 (2018) (comparing claims in workplaces
that do and do not require mandatory arbitration with class waivers, and estimating that mandatory
arbitration agreements reduce employee claims by over 98%) cf. David Horton, The Arbitration
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afford to pursue their claims in arbitration individually because the money value
of their individual claims is simply too small relative to the cost of arbitration.84
In addition to the costs of arbitration, and the fact that consumers and
employees are often bound to arbitrate by contracts of adhesion,85 there is
evidence that arbitration procedures and adjudicators tend to favor the
powerful companies that draft arbitration clauses into their contracts.86 Of
1,179 federal class actions filed between 2010 and 2014 that “companies
Rules: Procedural Rulemaking by Arbitration Providers, 105 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(arguing that the “Arbitration Rules” differ from the FRCP because the Arbitration Rules are
written in secret by for-profit corporations, vary by provider instead of being trans-substantive, and
favor speed over precision).
84. The New York Times found that “between 2010 and 2014, only 505 consumers went to
arbitration over a dispute of $2,500 or less. Verizon, which has more than 125 million subscribers,
faced 65 consumer arbitrations in those five years . . . . Time Warner Cable, which has 15 million
customers, faced seven. One federal judge remarked in an opinion that ‘only a lunatic or a fanatic
sues for $30.’” Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 82; see also Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming
Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of
Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309 (2015) (“The empirical evidence also provides
important insights as to why so few employees file claims in arbitration: (1) employees win less
often and win less money in arbitration than in litigation; (2) attorneys are less willing to take
employee claims that are headed to arbitration rather than litigation; (3) arbitration is not a
hospitable venue for pro se employees; and (4) arbitration is being used to eradicate the class
actions, collective actions, and even group litigation that are essential to many employees.”). Even
when plaintiffs win their claims, they receive lower damages on average from arbitration cases that
result in an award than they do in litigation cases that result in a verdict/judgment. Samuel
Estreicher et al., Evaluating Employment Arbitration: A Call for Better Empirical Research, 70
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 375 (2018) (comparing securities industry arbitrations to employment cases
that went to trial in federal court and finding that “[t]he securities industry awards had a mean of
$236,292 while the mean verdict/judgment in employment litigation cases was $377,030.93.”);
Mark Gough, A Tale of Two Forums: Employment Discrimination Outcomes in Arbitration and
Litigation, ILR REV. (2020) (finding that employees who prevail in arbitration win an average of
$362,000, “significantly lower” than the $678,000 average award for employees in state or federal
jury trials, based on a survey of 1,200+ plaintiff-side employment attorneys).
85. See ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY
ARBITRATION: ACCESS TO THE COURTS IS NOW BARRED FOR MORE THAN 60 MILLION
AMERICAN WORKERS 2–3 (2018), https://files.epi.org/pdf/144131.pdf; Sarath Sanga, A New
Strategy for Regulating Arbitration, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1121 (2019) (finding that 42% of
employment contracts contain arbitration provisions in an analysis of 800,000 documents filed by
public companies with the SEC); Imre Stephen Szalai, The Prevalence of Consumer Arbitration
Agreements by America’s Top Companies, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233 (2019) (finding that at least
“826,537,000 consumer arbitration agreements were in force” in 2018 and that 78 companies in the
Fortune 100 used class-action waivers and consumer arbitration agreements between 2010 and
2018).
86. Gough, supra note 84 (finding that the employee win rate in arbitration is 46%, lower than
the 62% employee win rate in state or federal court); Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 82
(“Taking Wall Street’s lead, businesses—including obstetrics practices, private schools and funeral
homes—have employed arbitration clauses to shield themselves from liability . . . . Thousands of
cases brought by single plaintiffs over fraud, wrongful death and rape are now being decided behind
closed doors. And the rules of arbitration largely favor companies, which can even steer cases to
friendly arbitrators, interviews and records show.”).
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sought to push into arbitration, judges ruled in their favor in four out of every
five cases.”87 Other studies highlight a dramatic expansion in arbitration
clauses in the employment setting and their effect on workers’ access to
court, particularly women and African American employees. By 2018, the
“share of workers subject to mandatory arbitration had risen from just over
2 percent” in 1992 to more than 55 percent.88 “Among companies with 1,000
or more employees, 65.1% have mandatory arbitration procedures. . . .
Extrapolating to the overall workforce, this means that 60.1 million
American workers no longer have access to the courts to protect their legal
employment rights and instead must go to arbitration.”89 Significantly,
“[a]rbitration is more common in low-wage workplaces. It is also more
common in industries that are disproportionately composed of women
workers and in industries that are disproportionately composed of African
American workers.”90
87. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 82 (emphasis added); see also Samuel
Estreicher, et al., Evaluating Employment Arbitration: A Call for Better Empirical Research, 70
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 375, 389 (2018) (noting that damage recoveries in arbitration may be lower
because “relatively weaker claims—where claimants are unable to attract competent counsel—are
more likely to go to an arbitration hearing on the merits than in litigation to verdict”). A more
mixed story about the advantages of corporate defendants surfaces from a recent empirical study
of arbitration outcomes between 2010 and 2016. See Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 82.
Significantly, as in civil litigation, the authors find that outcomes in arbitration turn heavily on
whether the plaintiff has legal representation and that the cost of arbitration has been affected by
recent reforms. Id. at 52 (finding that the average share of plaintiffs’ arbitration costs was $1,114);
Alexander Colvin & Mark Gough, Individual Employment Rights Arbitration in the United States:
Actors and Outcomes, ILR REV. (2015) (finding that self-represented employees have worse
outcomes—including settling less often, winning at hearings less often, and receiving lower
damages—in a survey of employment arbitration outcomes from AAA over eleven years); cf. Alan
B. Morrison, Can Mandatory Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims be Fair? The Kaiser
Permanente System, 70 DISP. RESOL. J., no. 3 (2015). Employees and consumers are especially
disadvantaged when they face corporations experienced in arbitration. Colvin & Gough, supra;
David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of
Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 114–115 (2015) (concluding that “consumers facing highlevel and super repeat-playing defendants are strongly disadvantaged in the arbitral forum relative
to consumers facing one-shot defendants” after analyzing 4,839 cases filed by consumers with the
AAA between July 2009 and December 2013). But they can level the playing field and increase
their chances of success by hiring themselves a “repeat-playing” plaintiff’s lawyer who is also
experienced in arbitration. Id. at 58.
88. Colvin, supra note 85, at 1; see also Elizabeth C. Tippett & Bridget Schaaff, How
Concepcion and Italian Colors Affected Terms of Service Contracts in the Gig Economy, 70
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 459 (2018) (finding that the prevalence of arbitration agreements and class
action waivers increased from one-third of companies before 2012 to two-thirds of companies in
2016 following two landmark Supreme Court decisions affirming the enforceability of class action
waivers in arbitration agreements).
89. Id. at 2.
90. Id.; see also Alexander J. S. Colvin, The Metastasization of Mandatory Arbitration, 94
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2019) (“It is the employers with the lowest paid workforces that are most
likely to impose mandatory arbitration on their employees. This is a concern from a policy
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Procedure scholars have paid close attention to the development of the
Supreme Court’s extratextual reading of the Federal Arbitration Act, the
statute largely responsible for the displacement of adjudication by
arbitration.91 Less attention has been paid, however, to the role that corporate
attorneys representing banks and the Chamber of Commerce played in
developing the legal analysis adopted by the Court,92 and to the class, gender,
and race disparities in who is affected by the dramatic expansion of binding
arbitration.93 These disparities are particularly significant given the lack of
transparency in arbitration. In the context of employment, for instance,
companies can use the confidentiality of arbitration proceedings to “draw a
heavy veil of secrecy around allegations of misconduct and their resolution
. . . . The relative invisibility of particular disputes and their outcomes in
arbitration . . . undermines the regulatory function of private enforcement
actions, which serve not only as a dispute resolution mechanism, but also as
an ex post alternative or supplement to ex ante prescriptive rules of conduct.”94
If there are advantages in an idealized conception of arbitration as
compared to litigation (lower cost, faster disposition,95 direct participation),
it matters that these advantages have not been realized in the actual
experience of ordinary people.96 It also matters that the process defects fall
disproportionately on already vulnerable and subordinated populations.
perspective because low paid employees are particularly vulnerable to infringements of their
employment rights, with researchers having found widespread violations of wage and hour laws
among these workers.”).
91. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law,
2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371 (2016).
92. See Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, supra note 82 (explaining corporate lawyers’
and the Chamber of Commerce’s lobbying activities against class actions).
93. Cf. Gilles, supra note 91, at 413 & n. 245.
94. Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679, 681–82
(2018) (noting the difficulty of empirically examining internal arbitration procedures because
procedures are not always standardized or published; emphasizing data showing that “the great
bulk of disputes that are subject to mandatory arbitration agreements . . . simply evaporate before
they are even filed” because of the costs and perceived barriers to recovery).
95. Cf. Alexander J. S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 (2011) (finding that arbitrations are
taking longer now than they used to). But see Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 82, at 51 (noting
that arbitration is “almost certainly faster” than litigation). However, no study showing faster
disposition rates in arbitration “attempts to control for the complexity of the cases that go to
litigation as opposed to arbitration.” Estreicher et al., supra note 84, at 382.
96. See Marissa Ditkowsky, #ustoo: The Disparate Impact of and Ineffective Response to
Sexual Harassment of Low-Wage Workers, 26 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 69, 83 (2019) (“Although
arbitration proponents cite cost savings, speed, and efficiency, in reality the cost saving is minimal
since arbitrators typically charge between $750 and $1,200 per day and hearings often experience
delays in scheduling.”); Raphael Ng’etich, The Current Trend of Costs in Arbitration: Implications
on Access to Justice and the Attractiveness of Arbitration, 5 ALT. DISP. RESOL. 111 (2017) (“The
current trend in arbitration indicates that arbitral proceedings are increasingly more expensive than
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C. Administrative Adjudication
Litigation in court has been displaced not only by arbitration but also
by the massive number of adjudications and claims processing that take place
before administrative agencies and never reach a court on appeal.97
Although agencies enjoy enormous flexibility in procedural design to permit
them to balance enforcement priorities, resource constraints, and statutory
mandates, evidence of both systemic bias and delay in flagship federal
agencies is disturbing.98 With respect to systemic bias, investigations by the
Wall Street Journal and New York Times found that the Securities and
Exchange Commission “prevails much more frequently—sometimes 100%
of the time in a given year—in its in-house enforcement proceedings” before
its own administrative law judges “than in court.”99 The structural problem
litigation . . . .”). But see Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 82, at 52 (“Combining all case types
and all providers, the average plaintiff’s share of arbitrators’ fees was a manageable $1,114 . . . .
Moreover, the median fee in the sample of all awarded cases is $0 . . . .”). However, the
administrative costs of arbitration can make it overall more expensive than litigation. Arbitration:
Not Necessarily A Better Option Than Litigation, BUS. LAW & TECH. GRP., http://www.btlg.us/
News_and_Press/articles/ arbitration.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2020) (“The cost of an
administrative agent and the arbitrator can make simple matters much more expensive than
litigation. The filing fee to a court is usually a one-time, upfront cost in the range of $100–200.
By comparison, arbitration filing fees are $750 or more, with ongoing administrative costs, plus the
cost of an arbitrator at a daily or hourly rate, in addition to the cost of your own lawyers and
experts.”); Vincent J. Love, Alternative Dispute Resolution for Accounting and Related Services
Disputes, CPA J., at 13 (2018) (“[A]rbitration can be costlier than litigation, as it typically requires
higher filing fees than courts . . . .”). The point is not that arbitration could not be designed to
function fairly. See Morrison, supra note 87. See also, Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration: Is It Just, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1648–53 (2005) (summarizing critiques of mandatory
consumer arbitration’s unfair impacts on individual consumers); David S. Schwartz, Mandatory
Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247 (2009); Judith Resnik, Diffusing
Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights,
124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015).
97. Barnett, supra note 36, at 1652–53.
98. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323–26 (1976) (challenge to accuracy of
Social Security disability determination); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123 (1951) (challenge to accuracy of subversive classifications made by the Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee); Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1,
n.20 (2018) (noting bias and political interference in Social Security Administration, Department
of Agriculture, EPA, and NLRB adjudications).
99. Barnett, supra note 36, at 1645; see also Lucille Gauthier, Insider Trading: The Problem
with the SEC’s In-House ALJs, 67 EMORY L.J. 123, 126 (2017) (“In the 2014 fiscal year, the SEC
brought four out of five enforcement actions in administrative proceedings rather than in federal
courts. Further, the SEC boasted a 90% win rate in administrative proceedings, and only a 69%
win rate in federal court, from October 2010 through March 2015.”); Drew Thornley & Justin
Blount, SEC In-House Tribunals: A Call for Reform, 62 VILL. L. REV. 261, 286 (2017) (“Combined
with the fact that the ALJs are SEC employees who lack Article III’s tenure and salary protections,
the SEC’s recent success rate in administrative proceedings before ALJs versus that in federal
district court at least arouses the perception of ALJs’ possible bias toward the SEC. It should also
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in the eyes of critics is that “in the administrative setting adjudication is
conducted and resolved by employees—often high ranking employees—of
the very agency whose existence is justified by the need for regulation and
which has decided to institute the particular regulatory proceeding in the first
place.”100 Moreover, in the SEC and other agencies “aberrations from
adjudicatory neutrality” are not rare, and not merely “commonplace”;
rather, they “represent the fundamental characteristics of the modern
administrative process.”101
Whether any specific procedural “aberrations” violate the constitutional
guarantee of due process and what reforms might eliminate them are hotly
debated in the literature—so too is the question when Article III adjudication
is constitutionally required.102 The primary concern from the perspective of
the actual is that in the seventy years since the passage of the Administrative
Procedure Act and implementation of its procedural safeguards, and in the
forty years since Henry Friendly’s famous article calling for
“experimentation” in procedural due process to deal with the demand for
mass processing of claims in the modern bureaucratic state,103 debate still
rages in no small part because evidence of bias reinforces the criticism that
the very structure of agency adjudication may be flawed. Critics insist there
is “a built-in preference for the position taken by the very agency of which
[the adjudicator] is a part.”104

be noted that the SEC’s in-house success rate could give it increased leverage during settlement
talks with defendants.”).
100. Martin H. Redish & Kristen McCall, Due Process, Free Expression, and the
Administrative State, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 297, 298 (2018).
101. Id. at 298–99. See also Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW
ENGLAND L. REV. 417, 419 (2011) (examining how factors such as “lack of independence, limited
opportunity for deliberate thinking, low motivation, and the low risk of judicial review . . . allow
implicit bias to drive decision making” among immigration judges); Tanvi Misra, DOJ Changed
Hiring to Promote Restrictive Immigration Judges, ROLL CALL (Oct. 29, 2019, 2:51 PM), https://
www.rollcall.com/2019/10/29/doj-changed-hiring-to-promote-restrictive-immigration-judges/.
102. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 36 (highlighting concerns with not just administrative law
judges, but even more informally appointed administrative judges); Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Management Side of Due Process Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of
Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L.
REV. 772 (1974) (criticizing accuracy and due process failures in agency adjudication); Christopher
J. Walker, Administrative Law Without Courts, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1620 (2018) (surveying
developments in administrative law through agency adjudication); David Ames, et al., Due Process
and Mass Adjudication, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2020) (analyzing decisional problems of the Board of
Veterans Appeals). But see Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 60
ADMIN. L. REV. 647 (2008) (discussing significant benefits of administrative adjudication).
103. Friendly, supra note 3, at 1291.
104. Redish & McCall, supra note 100, at 299.
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The administration of asylum and other immigration claims offer a
sobering example of process defects with grave human consequences.105
Under both Republican and Democratic administrations, individuals who
have already established a credible fear of persecution have been held in
indefinite detention pending adjudication of their claims106 and families have
been separated.107 Under the Trump administration’s “Remain in Mexico”
policy, thousands of asylum seekers have been forced to wait in Mexico
under unsafe conditions that make it difficult to attend court, obtain
assistance of counsel, or coordinate with retained counsel in the United
States to assert the right to asylum.108 “Tent courts” that rely on patchy
teleconferencing technology to connect to remotely located immigration
judges severely limit participation by litigants and public access.109 The
pressure to dispose of cases without a meaningful hearing is enormous, and
comes not only from the sheer number of cases and the structurally deficient
conditions in which hearings are supposed to take place, but from
105. Ming H. Chen & Zachary New, Silence and the Second Wall, 28 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
549, 561 (2019) (“[L]arge backlogs and processing delays in nearly every category of immigration
benefit have developed[] to the point that Congress and advocacy groups say they have reached
‘crisis levels (footnote omitted)’ . . . [T]here has been a surge in case processing times by 46%
over the past two fiscal years and a 91% increase since fiscal year 2014 . . . . These delays have
led those seeking green cards or other benefits to be stuck in a legal limbo where they are vulnerable
to the highly publicized increased enforcement initiatives of the Trump administration and being
unable to utilize the many legal and social benefits that their immigration statuses would impart to
them.”).
106. Michael D. Shear & Katie Benner, In New Effort to Deter Migrants, Barr Withholds Bail
to Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/us/politics/
barr-asylum-bail.html.
107. See, e.g., Dara Lind, The Trump Administration’s Separation of Families at the Border,
Explained, VOX (Aug. 14, 2018, 1:29 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/11/17443198/childrenimmigrant-families-separated-parents (describing family separation rates under the Trump
administration); Jasmine Aguilera, Here’s What to Know About the Status of Family Separation at
the U.S. Border, Which Isn’t Nearly Over, TIME (Oct. 25, 2019, 2:49 PM), https://time.com/
5678313/trump-administration-family-separation-lawsuits/ (same)[?]; Richard Gonzales, Obama
Immigrant Detention Policies Under Fire, NPR (June 12, 2015, 5:57 PM), https://www.npr.
org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/06/12/414023967/obama-immigrant-detenti on-policies-under-fire
(describing criticism of the Obama administration’s family detention policies).
108. Priscilla Alvarez, Confusion and Frustration in Tent Courts Along the Texas Border,
CNN (Sept. 21, 2019, 8:03 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/21/politics/texas-tent-courts/in
dex.html. On the secrecy and inaccessibility of new “tent courts” being set up along the southern
border to deal with immigration claims, see Manny Fernandez et al., The Trump Administration’s
Latest Experiment of the Border: Tent Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.ny
times.com/2019/09/12/us/border-tent-courts-asylum.html.
109. On the effects of teleconferencing in immigration removal proceedings, see Ingrid V.
Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109 NW. L. REV. 933, 941 (2015) (detainees “forced
to pursue a case over a video screen often appear bewildered or confused . . . [and] may be less
likely to understand their rights . . . less likely to request a court continuance to find a lawyer”; their
diminished participation and diminished access to counsel can result in a higher risk of deportation).
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appointments and promotion procedures adopted by the Department of
Justice in order to induce the speedy denial of claims.110
With respect to delay, although agencies are touted for their superior
efficiency relative to litigation in court, agency adjudication has become
notoriously slow in agencies where ordinary people seek to secure public
entitlements.111 In addition to the public scandal regarding more than 125
day backlogs in processing hundreds of thousands of benefits claims at the
Veterans Administration,112 a September 2015 Office of Inspector General
Report showed that of 800,000 indefinitely stalled veterans’ benefits claims,
more than 300,000 were claims filed by veterans who had died waiting for
an answer from the agency.113 In 2017, the Washington Post reported that in
110. Andrew R. Calderón, New Asylum Cases Swamp Border Courts, ABA JOURNAL (Sept.
20, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/new-asylum-cases-swamp-bordercourts (“These new cases are being assigned to judges under pressure to complete cases quickly, in
places where migrants have little hope of finding lawyers. On average, migrants wait nearly three
years for their cases to be completed, due to an unprecedented backlog, and this fiscal year, the
denial rate for asylum claims reached 48%. But for people waiting across the border in Mexico,
speed is critical. They are in dangerous places . . . that the U.S. Department of State has deemed
unsafe for U.S. travelers.”). See also Marissa Esthimer, Crisis in the Courts: Is the Backlogged
U.S. Immigration Court System at Its Breaking Point?, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/backlogged-us-immigration-courts-breaking-point (“With a
backlog of slightly more than 1 million removal cases as of August 2019—a number that has
quadrupled over the past decade—the courts have been unable to keep pace with enforcement and
policy shifts funneling more noncitizens into the system and the changing nature of migration at
the Southwest border.”). Class action procedures have been developed in some agencies to handle
the demand for mass processing of certain kinds of claims, but they are rarely used. Michael
Sant’Ambrogio & Adam Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126 YALE L.J. 1600, 1659
(2017) (noting that although sixty-nine agencies and two Article I courts have rules that permit
some form of aggregation or consolidation, only twenty-eight had reported decisions involving use
of class actions, and only 11 had decisions involving consolidation). The authors concede that in
some areas of administrative adjudication aggregation and consolidation as solutions to mass
processing entail serious costs that can be effectively mitigated only for certain kinds of claims. Id.
at 1687 (“[A]gencies that award indivisible relief or large volumes of similar types of claims are
particularly ripe candidates for aggregation.”). They are even more skeptical about the promise of
the kinds of “informal aggregation” that have been used in the asylum context. Id. at 1664 (pointing
to “surge courts” established in West Texas as an example of informal aggregation).
111. Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Private Enforcement in Administrative Courts, 72 VAND. L.
REV. 425, 458 n.149 (2019) (“[S]ignificant delays in agency adjudication, particularly in large
benefits programs, are notorious and persistent.”).
112. Leo Shane III, VA: Claims Backlog Is Better, But Is Never Going Away, MIL. TIMES (Dec.
29, 2015), https://www.militarytimes.com/veterans/2015/12/29/va-claims-backlog-is-better-butis-never-going-away/.
113. VA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., Veterans Health Administration: Review of Alleged
Mismanagement at the Health Eligibility Center 9 (2015), https://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG14-01792-510.pdf; see also Natsumi Antweiler, Creating an Unprecedented Number of Precedents
at the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2311, 2318–19 (2019)
(“The VA claims processing system’s backlog totals 900,000 claims across the United States, and
continues to grow . . . . In total, the average time between the claim’s initial filing to the ultimate
disposition can take between five to seven years.”); Hugh B. McClean, Delay, Deny, Wait Till They
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the past year 10,000 people had died while awaiting adjudication of Social
Security disability benefits appeals.114 As of March 2019 in the 169 cities
where the Social Security Administration provides hearings for benefits
claims the wait for a hearing averages 15.5 months—it is under twelve
months in less than a dozen of those cities, and in only one is the wait time
less than eleven months.115
Kafkaesque problems of delay with the administration of veterans and
social security benefits warrant close scrutiny because these programs are
designed to assist people in periods of extreme vulnerability, they require the
adjudication of massive numbers of claims on an annual basis, and they were
at the center of the Supreme Court’s endorsement of a flexible approach to
procedural due process in the administrative state in the 1970s and 1980s.116
Tragically, flexibility has not produced the intended benefits (innovation,
efficiency, and avoidance of adversarialism).
Although far less attention has been paid to state level agencies,
especially state agencies that displace litigation in court, the problems of
delay and bias appear to be just as acute there. Workers compensation bars
eligible employees from suing in court for their work-related injuries in
exchange for health and disability insurance benefits paid by their employer
while they recover. In many states, however, cost-cutting reforms over the
last two decades have significantly diminished employer premiums, mainly
by introducing procedural barriers such as time-consuming audits, secondary
review, and reversal of doctors’ recommendations for the treatment of
Die: Balancing Veterans’ Rights and Non-Adversarial Procedures in the VA Disability Benefits
System, 72 SMU L. REV. 277, 284–85 (2019) (“In all, it can take up to seven years to appeal a claim
to the Veterans Court. Additional delays can extend this time period another two years . . . . While
this statistic may seem low, the Government Accountability Office reviewed data from fiscal years
2010 to 2015 and found that the VA denied 43% of veterans’ initial claims . . . . Given the high
remand rates of the Board and the Veterans Court, the data suggests that a significant number of
claims that may have been decided in error will never be reviewed.”).
114. Terrence McCoy, 597 Days. And Still Waiting, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/sf/local/2017/11/20/10000-people-died-waiting-for-a-disability-decisi
on-in-the-past-year-will-he-be-next/?utm_term=.7a077e115a89; see also Ryan Weitendorf, Give
Grandma Her Day in Court: in Defense of Competitive Selection of Administrative Law Judges for
the Social Security Administration, 27 ELDER L.J. 455, 460–461 (2019) (“Over 900,000 people
have been waiting more than 600 days for an ALJ to rule on their claim for Social Security benefits
(footnote omitted). In 2017, this resulted in more than 10,000 people dying while waiting for a
ruling on their adjudication (footnote omitted).”).
115. Average Wait Time Until Hearing Held Report (For the Month of May 2020), Hearings
and Appeals, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (last visited June 28, 2020), https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/Data
Sets/archive/01_FY2020/01_May_NetStat_Report.html. There are of course even more extreme
examples involving the weaponization of delay in the Trump administration’s approach to
immigration enforcement.
116. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
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workers. North Dakota’s Workforce Safety and Insurance Agency—the
state’s only workers’ compensation insurance company—relies on out-ofstate physicians working for private companies to review disputed insurance
benefits claims.117 These out-of-state doctors “reversed the recommendations
of workers’ physicians 75 percent of the time.”118 The agency’s own medical
director resigned after protesting that the “agency’s lawyers overrode valid
medical opinions and diagnoses to beat back the appeals of injured
workers.”119 In California, a 2012 law allowing retroactive review of past
benefit decisions resulted in denial of ongoing medical treatment in ninetyone percent of the cases reviewed, more than twice the denial rate for patients
with ordinary health insurance.120 One state workers’ compensation judge
who retired after twenty-two years on the bench observed that “[t]he only
interest that’s being protected here is industry . . . . [Workers] are losing their
voice” in the process.121
Together with procedural concerns in arbitration, the evidence from
administrative adjudication indicates that some of the most important
alternatives to trial are not functioning fairly. Indeed, the more marginalized
the relevant population involved, the more severe the procedural defects and
abuses appear to be.
III. Conclusion
If there was an actual revolution in procedural due process in the midtwentieth century, it has been undermined by significant counterrevolutionary forces. No modern court system and no alternative
adjudicative body appears to have the structure and capacity to efficiently,
accurately, and fairly adjudicate the claims that regularly arise in the lives of
ordinary people who appear before it.122 The values that animate procedural
117. Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, The Demolition of Workers’ Comp, PROPUBLICA
(Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-demolition-of-workers-compensation.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Grabell & Berkes, supra note 117.
121. Id.
122. Even the lower federal courts face staggering caseloads, resulting in diminished
opportunities to be heard, a disturbing gap between outcomes in published and unpublished
opinions, and a rise in case management doctrines that diminish the incidence of trial and upset the
traditional division of labor between judges and jurors. See, e.g., JOE CECIL & DONNA STIENSTRA,
FED. JUD. CTR., DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: A DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES IN THE
COURTS OF APPEALS (1993), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/100178 NCJRS.pdf
(describing the growth of motions screening practices in federal appellate courts); Robert M. Tata,
Still The Fastest Justice Anywhere, LAW360 (June 17, 2014), https://www.huntonak.com/
images/content/3/6/v3/3631/Still-The-Fastest-Justice-Anywhere.pdf (noting the difference in time
interval to trial between the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 11.1 months,

Winter 2021

IDEAL AND ACTUAL IN PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

291

due process are not dead, but the divide between ideal and actual procedure
today has become dangerously wide.
Quite obviously, procedural failure cannot be understood if it is not
studied. Counter-revolutionary forces in the enforcement of basic due
process rights in particular need to be more closely examined. These include
the effects of draconian funding cuts to state courts and to public service
organizations that provide access to counsel,123 failure to create enough seats
on the state or federal bench to enable judges to provide due process in each
and every case they handle,124 a spectacular failure on the part of the
organized bar to meet the need for legal representation among middle and
low income Americans, a long-standing, well-funded ideological assault on
access to justice and the adversary system led by organizations who stand to
gain by suppressing the claims of ordinary people, and a liberal assault on
adversary adjudication led first by New Deal lawyers supremely confident
in the capacity of administrative agencies, and then followed by a generation
of liberal ethicists and proceduralists who attacked the adversary system as
rigged for the benefit of lawyers and inferior to alternatives.125 The Supreme
Court’s increasingly cramped view of both due process and the right to trial
under the Seventh Amendment is relevant, but this factor has so monopolized
attention of proceduralists as to have obscured analysis of these other forces
and the startling consequences for ordinary people litigating outside federal courts.
with Western District of New York, 67.1 months); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 459 (2004) (noting a “60% decline in the absolute number of trials since the mid 1980s”);
see generally Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the Litigation Explosion,
Liability Crisis, and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982 (2003) (discussing procedural developments that have prioritized speedy
pretrial disposition); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122
YALE L.J. 522 (2012) (same).
123. On the direct costs to litigants in delay, overburdened courts and increased filing fees
arising from budget cuts during the Great Recession, see Heather Rogers, Business-Killing Cuts to
State Courts, CAL. BAR J. (Nov. 2012), https://www.calbarjournal.com/ November2012/TopHead
lines/TH1.aspx; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., COSCA BUDGET SURVEY RESPONSES, https://cdm1
6501.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ financial/id/182. On the hiring freezes, layoffs,
reduced hours of operations, increased fees, closure of courts and consolidation, and reduced
salaries, see Daniel J. Hall, Reshaping the Face of Justice: The Economic Tsunami Continues,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (2011) https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_
file/0021/15870/hall.pdf. More broadly, see MICHAEL D. GREENBERG & SAMANTHA CHERNEY,
RAND CORP., DISCOUNT JUSTICE: STATE COURT BELT-TIGHTENING IN AN ERA OF FISCAL
AUSTERITY (2017). On diminished funding for legal services, see David Luban, Taking Out the
Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209 (2003).
124. The federal judiciary has not increased in size since the 1990s and has developed and
increasingly relied on motions screening procedures to avoid oral argument in many cases. The
process dates to the late 1960s in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals but has expanded dramatically
over the last two decades. CECIL & STIENSTRA, supra note 122 at 2–6.
125. Spaulding, Due Process, supra note 4.
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The concrete human effects of these forces need to be better understood,
and not just within the traditional, relatively antiseptic framework of
aggregate efficiency and accuracy. Doctrinal and quantitative empirical
research needs to be complemented by rigorous qualitative work—“thick
description” in the anthropological sense—to surface the social costs of
procedural failure paid by those who suffer from it. For too many Americans
the status quo is nothing short of dehumanizing. Trying to manage wage
garnishment, property seizure, driver’s license suspension, and even arrest
in the enforcement of private or public debts—debts the legitimacy of which
is open to doubt because there has been no adjudication of the merits—not
only undermines faith in government, it exacerbates financial insecurity and,
when arrests occur, separates families. To present one’s case without the
benefit of an advocate, or even a competent translator, is to be rendered
helpless while one’s rights are before the court.126 Trying to stay afloat while
waiting months or years for a disability benefits decision is itself disabling.127
And having to abandon arbitration altogether or arbitrate before a biased
decision maker after being barred from court—all on the fiction that a
contract of adhesion expresses one’s ‘preference’ for alternative dispute
resolution—more closely resembles the Queen’s justice in Alice in
Wonderland than the rule of law.128 In a word, ordinary people are being
driven “to the wall.”129
Nor can these procedural failures be cured unless they are taught. The
distortions of procedural idealism can only be corrected by introducing
students, unblinkingly, to the actual. Indeed, remedies can best be forged by
lawyers who are trained in classrooms that are themselves consistently
inclusive of the experiences of ordinary people in the courts. Teaching
procedural rules of decision divorced from the experience and testimony of
those who have to live with them is trafficking in the very denial of a
meaningful opportunity to be heard that due process is supposed to provide.
Students should be invited to see procedure from the perspective of those
who live with it and see its on the ground realities, not just the perspective
of those who design procedure, and all too often fall into the armchair
abstractions of procedural idealism. For realists, the actual is not a
supplement or complement to the doctrine, it is the doctrine in every
meaningful sense of the term. It is what the courts do in fact.
126. LAURA ABEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., LANGUAGE ACCESS IN STATE COURTS 3–5
(2009) (noting widespread failure to provide interpreters in civil cases).
127. So too is trying to access any court that has not been designed to accommodate people
with disabilities. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
128. We suspect the pressures of mass processing of claims are also demoralizing for the
judges, administrators, and alternative decision makers charged with handling excessive dockets.
129. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
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A virtue of this approach in an increasingly diverse twenty-first century
classroom and an increasingly diverse twenty-first century profession is that
the subject of procedure could begin to model the kind of diversity,
emotional intelligence, and cultural competence that women students,
students of color, first generation and low income students, and other
minorities have long been calling on law schools to provide—one that
models the highest professional standards of intellectually rigorous
adversarial exchange on cases and controversies. Another virtue is that the
local is where the interactive relationship between substance and procedure
(and between fact and law) is most dynamic, most illuminating, and most
determinative of both outcomes and the perceived legitimacy of those
outcomes. It is local knowledge, cultures, and practices that render any rule
of procedure—no matter how distant its source—interpretable. Parochial and
often deeply situational facts also invest procedure with power differentials
that may dwarf those of substantive rules of decision. If lawyers and judges
need abstract principles against which to measure any individual process,
they surely also need this acute sensitivity to local knowledge that
proceduralists are uniquely positioned to teach.
Finally, the field of procedure needs a genealogy of both summary and
suspended process in the United States—a history that uncovers the impulses
that tend to make certain populations targets of summary and suspended
process. This history might help us understand, as in Jenkins, how judges,
lawyers, and other officials who both espouse and regularly follow basic
principles of due process in some contexts can deviate so sharply and
callously from it in others. To more fully appreciate how and why this
occurs, we need research that probes beyond the efficiency demands
associated with crowded dockets,130 and beyond the historical consciousness
of the progressive movement’s achievements in the adoption of new Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and the Warren Court’s due process
revolution, to some of the darker pathological forces that have motivated
procedural “reform” in this country.
One critical starting point is the Fourteenth Amendment’s imposition
of equal protection and due process guarantees on the states. Every state
constitution both before and after the Civil War contained a guarantee of due
process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment became necessary to prevent
state governments in the South, run by unreconstructed former Confederate
leaders, from using procedural “innovations” to disenfranchise, intimidate,
dehumanize, and systematically deny newly freed African Americans due
130. Though, as Maggie Gardner has shown, docket pressure is a gravely serious issue—
increasingly a threat to the fairness and accuracy of even federal trial court decision making. See
Maggie Gardner, Dangerous Citations, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
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process of law.131 White supremacy, summary procedure, and suspension of
due process of law went hand in hand.132 Leaving this history out of the
procedure canon obscures the actual and its deviations from the ideal. It also
obscures the substance-procedure hydraulics of many canonical cases and
the scope of procedural failure.133
This reorientation from the ideal to the actual in procedure’s empirical
methods, pedagogy, and historical consciousness is overdue. And it should
take place before and as a condition of attempting to decide what elements
of ideal procedure, especially the gold standard of jury trial, should continue
to inform due process analysis. The hope, to be sure, is that this reorientation
will reaffirm the virtues of the adversary system and draw the actual costs of
its alternatives into sharper relief. Short of full adversary procedures, the
default presumptions in favor of ex ante notice and a meaningful opportunity
to be heard must not be balanced away under the test set out in Mathews.
The most basic contradiction of the ideal/actual divide in procedure is that
although it is black letter law that these default presumptions can only be set
aside in the face of exigent circumstances,134 they are set aside on a daily
basis in run of the mill cases involving no exigency because the party who is
deprived of due process is charged with raising and demonstrating the very
procedural defects she is suffering. A defect in notice or the quality of the
hearing means all too often that, by definition, the party will not be aware of
her procedural due process claim, or unaware until the damage to
adjudication of the merits is done. The problem is not the existence of the
right, or its ambiguity at the margin, but the unique relationship between the
common form of its violation and the pathway for asserting that fact—all too
often, the form of violation destroys the path to a remedy for ordinary people.
Similarly, the tragedy of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services lies
not only in its evisceration of access to counsel in civil cases (if the interests
131. The turn to summary process extended well into the Jim Crow period. See Norman W.
Spaulding, The Impersonation of Justice: Lynching, Dueling, and Wildcat Strikes in Nineteenth
Century America, in ROUTLEDGE RESEARCH COMPANION TO LAW AND HUMANITIES IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (Simon Stern & Nan Goodman eds., 2017) (discussing the
expansion of lynching and the response of some elite lawyers to make the criminal justice system
more summary and punitive, not, in the first instance, toward those responsible for lynchings, but
for those who were targeted by them).
132. Cases such as Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), suggest that the
problem of procedural exceptionalism was not unique to reconstruction laws.
133. Canonical cases in which class, gender, disability, and race intersect with procedural law
include Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755
(1989); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011);
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Galloway
v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
134. See supra note 10.
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of a mother against termination of her parental rights by the state are not
strong enough to warrant assistance of counsel, precious few property and
liberty interests in civil cases will be weighty enough to make counsel
constitutionally mandatory under Mathews balancing), nor in the fact that
the Court blinked at the lower court’s racialized and gendered treatment of
Ms. Lassiter.135 The enduring contradiction of the case is that it left the
burden on unrepresented litigants to surface procedural defects rising to the
level of due process violations while inviting reviewing courts, even on a
record manifestly shaped by procedural error, to retrospectively conclude
that a lawyer could not have made a difference as long as the correct
substantive outcome appears to have been reached. There may be other valid
reasons to conclude that counsel should not be provided in such cases, but a
more imperious abstraction from the concept of a meaningful opportunity to
be heard than this is difficult to imagine.
The predicament created by these approaches to the constitutional
minimum standard for due process is of course deepened by the severe
budget crises courts have weathered over the last three decades as state
legislatures have increasingly forced courts into a fee for service self-funding
model. Courts are struggling to stay afloat. But if desperately needed
funding for the judiciary is to increase, judges, lawyers, and legal academics
must be prepared to promote the virtues of due process with a degree of
conviction some appear to have lost at the turn of the century. If the bench
and bar do not support procedural fairness and access to the adversary
system, if they treat litigation as an anachronism of our common law heritage
and uncritically endorse procedural innovation, legislators can hardly be
expected to make the funding of courts a fiscal priority.
Of course, even if substantial funding increases were approved by the
political branches, the demand for mass processing of claims will remain.
Indeed, the standard for due process of law will be tested in fundamentally
new ways as the next wave of procedural reform animated by technological
advances in artificial intelligence crests.136 Engineers are already touting the
transformative promise of disruptive innovation in access to legal services,
and some legal experts appear eager to endorse the outsourcing that this
technology enables—replacing the authority of judges and lawyers with
a new elite of software coders and their promises about algorithms and
machine learning.137
135. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). See Brooke D. Coleman, Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services: Why is it Such a Lousy Case?, 12 NEV. L. REV. 591 (2012).
136. Norman W. Spaulding, Is Human Judgment Necessary? AI, Algorithmic Governance, and
the Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICS OF AI (Dubber, et al. eds., 2020).
137. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1142 (2019) (“[T]here
should be little conceptual reason to balk at applying [AI] technology to AI judges[.]”).
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The call for procedural justice innovation in zones where procedural
backlog, lack of resources, and due process deficiencies are most stark has
grown loud enough to persuade key regulators and the bar.138 A note of
caution from the perspective of the actual seems warranted: artificial
intelligence (AI) innovations that do not enhance notice and the right to a
meaningful opportunity to be heard, and systems designed without carefully
structured input from and accountability to the populations they purport to
serve, are likely to reproduce the very problems of access to justice they
purport to solve. Ordinary people will face new forms of even more
“enclosed,” centralized, anti-democratic procedure.139 Cheap, accessible,
efficient dispute resolution systems that are also secret, biased, underparticipatory, unaccountable, and intrusive on the privacy of low income and
vulnerable populations might finally achieve mass processing, but only by
privileging efficiency over accuracy, fairness, participation, and dignity.
Proceduralists ourselves stand to be marginalized by these AI alternatives,
as may entire segments of the legal profession. If we do not abandon the
ideal for the actual, we will have earned this fate.

138. Lyle Moran, California Bar Gives Approval to Broad Sandbox Approval, ABAJOURNAL
(May 15, 2020, 10:33 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/california-bar-gives-appro
val-to-broad-sandbox-proposal.
139. See Spaulding, supra note 136; Norman W. Spaulding, The Enclosure of Justice:
Courthouse Architecture, Due Process, and the Dead Metaphor of Trial, 24 YALE J. L. & HUMAN.
311, 340–41 (2012).

